Is Election Really more Accountable than Sortition?

Many political scientists, theorists, and philosophies have argued that sortition is not a suitable form of government because of its lack of accountability. This article seeks to examine the accountablity argument by comparing sortition to the system that presumably has accountability, election.

Comparison Scope

To perform a fair comparison between sortition and election, we will only be comparing “pure” regimes. In our pure regimes, there are no checks and balances that would otherwise catch mistakes and depravities committed by the regime and therefore “taint” our comparison. So, a single legislative body rules over the state.

• For elections, representatives are selected by the public as the elected.

• In sortition, representatives are selected by a lottery of the public as a juror.

Analysis Scenarios and Conditions

In my analysis, I only look at two simple scenarios:

• “Full Takeover Attempt” - I imagine a scenario where the political leadership tries to take over democracy through legislative means and replace it with an oligarchy.

• “Typical Bribery” - I imagine a scenario where political leadership solicits a bribe in exchange for a favorable vote. In another interpretation, this is any scenario where representatives choose to self-serve rather than serve the public.

My analysis looks at two conditions:

• Public Moral Virtue - What is the moral temperament of this society? I look at two options:

  • A fully self serving, Machiavellian society.

  • A partially self serving, partially altruistic society.

• Voter Capacities - What is the capability of the voter? I assess two possibilities:

  • Incompetent at voting.

  • Competent at voting.

In the Machiavellian society, all people behave as self interested and rational actors seeking to maximize their personal material interests above all other interests.

In the partially self serving society, although many people remain self-interested, they also balance self interest with some conception of the greater societal good.

I evaluate each scenario based on if either election or sortition produces the better outcome.

The Examination

SCENARIO 1: Full Takeover Attempt

1(a) Competent voters, fully Machiavellian society

In the lottocratic regime, the jurors realize that they can just take full power and make themselves the new oligarchs of the state. Therefore the jurors vote to repeal the Constitution and elect themselves tyrants.

In the elected regime, the elected also realize that they can just take full power and make themselves the new oligarchs of the state. Voters must wait until the next election to remove their elected representatives from office. Before the voters can react, the elected representatives vote to repeal the Constitution and elect themselves tyrants.

Looking at this simple scenario, there are no differences in the results. Both a majority of elected and lottocratic representatives can commit a conspiracy to disband the democratic state in favor of an oligarchy.

1(b) Competent voters, partially Machiavellian society

In a lottocracy, self serving jurors don’t know who is self serving and who is altruistic. Therefore they don’t know whether or not a takeover is possible. Therefore they must secretively meet with other jurors and form a conspiracy. If they meet the wrong juror, their plot could be found out, leading to expulsion from the assembly to be tried for treason.

In an elected regime, self serving electeds also don’t know who else is self serving and who is altruistic. However they have one large advantage over the lottocracy: time. Electeds often serve multiple terms over many years. During this time, they forge stronger relationships with their elected colleagues and form stronger coalitions. This time is also used to evaluate whether colleagues can be trusted for a treasonous power grab.

It could be argued that sortition creates chaos, that eventually a randomly allotted body will be filled with sufficienty corrupt jurors to then initiate the takeover. However such chaos is statistically impossible with a sufficiently well designed scientific random sample.

It could also be argued that competent voters, because of their high competence, are able to select against Machiavellian personalities and thereby lower the chances of the takeover.

Because we must assume high voter competence, election therefore wins this scenario.

1(c) Incompetent voters, fully Machiavellian society

As with the competent voters scenario 1(a), the voters are irrelevant. Election ties with sortition.

1(d) Incompetent voters, partially Machiavellian society

With incompetent voters, voters are no longer able to select against Machiavellian personalities to lower the chances of takeover as in 1(b). Now the elected can forge corrupt relationships without competent electoral feedback. In contrast, the jurors do not have the chance to forge corrupt relationships over time. Sortition wins this scenario.

SCENARIO 2: Typical Bribery

A less dramatic and more typical scenario is bribery, where money is given in exchange for votes.

2(a) Competent voters, fully Machiavellian society

The elected must balance his corruption with the needs of re-election. Corruption ought to be expected when 1) the elected believes he will not be re-elected. 2) the elected believes he can get away with corruption secretively despite competent voters. The last term in office ought to be an extravaganza of graft.

Sortition fares worse in this scenario. Machiavellian jurors will always behave as the elected in their last term of office. Elections win.

2(b) Incompetent voters, fully Machiavellian society

In a society of incompetent voters, voters are not able to distiguish a corrupt elected from an uncorrupt elected. Election and sortition are tied in corruption.

2(c) Competent voters, partially Machiavellian society

In the elected regime, this scenario acts similarly to the fully machiavellian society from 2(a), except now only some of the elected will join in on the corruption rather than all at the last term of office. If a majority of the elected are altruistic, they have powers to punish and expel the corrupt.

In the lottocratic regime, corruption becomes difficult if a majority of the jurors are altruistic. A juror will only practice graft if he believes he can secretly get away with corruption. The last term is no longer an issue because the lottocracy has its own powers to punish and expel the corrupt.

Lottocracy might perform better than election depending on whether you believe elections are more or less likely to select Machiavellian personalities. I think most evidence suggests this is true in real elections. However, in our hypothetical universe of competent voters, competent voters will be able to select against Machiavellian personalities.

Therefore election is the superior option in this scenario.

2(d) Incompetent voters, partially Machiavellian society

In the elected regime, incompetent voters are unable to distinguish real corruption or altruism from propaganda. The elected body can only suppress corruption through self regulation. If a majority of the elected are altruistic, suppression could be possible. If a majority are not, corruption will have free reign.

In the lottocratic regime, the jurors also can only suppress corruption if they compose a majority.

However, assuming that elections are more likely to choose Machiavellian personalities, sortition performs better in this scenario. As we assumed the best possible competence out of the voters in 2(c), it is only fair to assume the worst incompetence of voters for 2(d).

Therefore sortition is the superior option in this scenario.

The Final Tally

Election wins in three (3) scenarios:

• Takeover - Competent voters, partially Machiavellian society

• Bribery - Competent voters, fully Machiavellian society

• Bribery - Competent voters, partially Machiavellian society

Sortition wins at two (2) scenarios:

• Takover - Incompetent voters, partially Machiavellian society

• Bribery - Incompetent voters, partially Machiavellian society

Election and Sortition tie three (3) scenarios:

• Takeover - Competent voters, fully Machiavellian society

• Takover - Incompetent voters, fully Machiavellian society

• Bribery - Incompetent voters, fully Machiavellian society

My takeaway then is that we shouldn’t automatically assume that elections have an accountability advantage against sortition. Elections will be superior only in certain scenarios when voters have sufficient competence to hold the elected accountable. Sortition has an accountability advantage in scenarios where voters are incompetent.